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This does not mean the war was not merited, or that the overall impact on Iraqis, the region, the Global War of Terror, or American security has not been positive. One looks at Iraq today and sees a country and its citizens that are much better off than they were under the brutal regime of Hussein and his Baathist Party. Although Weapons of Mass Destruction have not been found, and may never be, a strong case can be made that the world is safer with a democratic and disarmed Iraq. This paper is not addressing the decision of whether or not the
United States and its partners should have conducted military operations to depose Saddam
Hussein and his henchmen. Nor does it examine the strategic political decisions that resulted in military actions. Instead it will review the method and manner that the operations were carried out, specifically the post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations conducted by the military at the tactical and operational level and their strategic impact. Finally, it will examine what lessons should be incorporated into the transformation efforts of the United States military preparing for full spectrum operations in the 21 st century. This review will not only look at Operation Iraq
Freedom, but will also review two major conflicts of the past century-the Philippine War and the Second World War-as well as a critical lesson following the Korean War, to determine if there are common lessons to be extracted as to the conduct of post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations.
The Philippine War of [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] has a number of similarities to the present conflict. This war, which on the strictest of military terms was won on the first day of battle with the sinking of the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, proceeded to drag on through four years of counterinsurgency operations, resulting in thousands of deaths and domestic turmoil both in the Philippines and at home in America. 1 The Second World War is generally held up as a model of post-conflict effective planning, though often with more admiration than likely it deserves.
Nevertheless, the planning and innovations implemented in occupied Germany are worthy of review. Following the Korean War, the Korean Augmentation Troops to the United States Army (KATUSA) Program has proven to be one of the most effective programs the military has undertaken to improve civil-military relations between United States soldiers stationed in a foreign country and the local civilian population. This paper will examine these historical cases for lessons to carry forth in our transformation efforts, particularly as they deal with counterinsurgency and post-conflict operations.
Much has been written about Phase IV operations recently. In a number of critical articles, the American military has been taken to task for conducting brilliant Phase III combat operations, but being ill-prepared for Phase IV post-conflict operations. Unfortunately, this is an accurate critique of a United States military failing that has reoccurred often in American history.
At least part of the reason lies with the false dichotomy of Phase III and Phase IV operations.
As Conrad Crane has argued, Phase IV operations should more accurately be considered Phase IIIB operations, or perhaps we should do away with phasing all together. Either way, it is clear that the two phases are not sequential. 2 Post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations actually begin during combat operations. If the military-as well as the interagency community-has not been organized, trained, and equipped to handle these operations simultaneously, the results are typically disastrous. The planning and preparation for operations across the entire spectrum must address simultaneous conflict, post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations to ensure the military can 'win the peace' and fulfill the ultimate goals of the operations, unless the goals are to ensure continued turmoil and tragedy.
Action and Units of Employment. As currently envisioned, the Units of Action will be similar to a for an occupying army, including the requirement to administer force "strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity" and to protect "religion and morality, strictly private property, and the persons of the inhabitants." 14 But it also emphasized that continued resistance in the form of guerilla warfare or assisting the enemy could be harshly dealt with, up to and including summary execution. 15 The military governors ordered their subordinates to win the hearts and minds of the populace by enforcing the rule of law, by providing security, through the completion of civic projects and public works, and by ensuring government and education operations continued. They indeed had a good grasp of the issues surrounding occupation
duties. Yet these same operational commanders often underestimated the enemy and provided blueprints for municipal organization. 16 These commands were decentralized and very independent at the tactical level, and the local military commander had almost complete control to adjust the implementation of these orders to fit the local situation. By November of 1899 there were 51 such commands, and this grew dramatically to 639 by December of 1900. 17 An example of one of these commanders was Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes. He had first been appointed as the Provost Marshall in Manila, where he forced the cleaning and improved sanitation of slaughterhouses, marketplaces, dispensaries, and hospitals; reestablished garbage-collection; opened public schools; fixed city lighting and water systems;
and rebuilt roads and bridges. He reestablished a police force, and reopened government administrative offices. Later, after being given command of a brigade and appointed as one of the local military governors, he took this same approach within his district and quickly won over the local populace. Another example was Brigadier General James Smith, a brigade commander assigned as the military governor on the Island of Negros. He was experienced in Civil Affairs, humanitarianism, and political issues as well as military affairs. Upon attempting to immediately implement self-rule in his district, he found local tribal in-fighting was putting his plans in jeopardy. He therefore shifted the focus of his office as military governor to the establishment of local elections, and most importantly, he recruited, trained, and equipped a local police force. Once security was established and local elections were held, he implemented self-rule, which then worked well. The great majority of the 639 commands enjoyed success stories similar to these. 18 Clearly there were factors that make a direct comparison of the Philippine War and today's operations difficult. There were cases then, especially during the last year of the war when the United States followed a get-tough policy with the last revolutionary holdouts, when
American commanders and forces on the ground conducted military actions that today we might well regard as war crimes. 19 American soldiers also died at a rate much greater than those today in Iraq or Afghanistan, and morale of the solders often dropped very low. This was partly due to the environmental conditions soldiers faced in the Philippines, and the lack of capability of the United States to provide sufficient medical support and supplies to its troops. Another significant factor was the lack of technology prevented news coverage from directly impacting military daily activities at the tactical level as it often does today.
Yet there are more similarities to today's missions and circumstances than differences.
Security and reconstruction efforts did succeed, and they succeeded because leaders and 
WORLD WAR II
During and after World War II the military again successfully conducted security and reconstruction efforts, and rebuilt the nations of Germany and Japan. This paper will restrict its review to Germany, but there are equally valuable lessons to be learned by studying the city-that the hearts and minds of the people are won. Regardless of the actions at the highest levels, it was the combination of civil affairs detachments and local occupying troops that impacted greatest on the German civilians faced with a war in its last throes and with a monumental rebuilding effort. As towns were conquered, the local civilians were "gripped with fear that the Nazis might return and take vengeance on them." 30 Military government detachments successfully incorporating their earlier training to "supply courage and stamina to thousands of frightened people, suppress hysteria where it threatened to break out, control refugees, keep the roads open for military traffic, and in some places, provide security against German paratroopers and partisans." 31 But there were also many lessons to be learned at the local level that would have been hard to anticipate at the schoolhouse, but were quickly learned by experience. An example occurred when the civil-military detachment and local military commander in Herzogenrath were ordered to confiscate all bicycles to hinder counterinsurgency operations and to prevent further refugee migration. Unfortunately, without their bicycles "the miners stopped going to work and doctors and nurses could not make their rounds." 32 The bicycles were quickly returned to the local inhabitants. There were many unintended consequences of rules being imposed from higher levels that were first felt at the local level, and that was where the mitigating solutions were enacted.
The difference between the strategic level view and those at the tactical level was illustrated by the following memo sent from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in December 1944 to the army groups for dissemination throughout their commands and to the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD). This memo arrived when local commanders and civilian affairs detachments were trying to prevent the starvation and death of civilians critically short of food and coal in the conquered towns near the Rhine. In the memo, tactical commanders were told "that no effort will be made to rehabilitate or succor the German people.
Rather, the sole aim of military government is to further military objectives…. Reports from the field indicate that military government detachments and G-5 staffs and subordinate formations are inclined to try and do too much to relieve the problems of the German people. There seems to be a disposition to approach the administration of Germany with the idea that it is our job to make Germany a 'happy land' again. It is essential that all military government personnel be disabused to this concept." 33 Most military units ignored these directions almost as widely as they did the non-fraternization policy. They just did not make sense to the soldiers on the ground dealing with the grim realities facing them each day, and who, "even though they might accept the idea of German collective guilt…did not feel at ease as agents of collective retribution." and until then much of the work conducted was planned and executed at the tactical levels by young commanders and troops. 35 Most of the work in the local villages and small cities went to the I detachments, consisting of four officers and five enlisted men, and two jeeps with trailers. Their first order of business upon entering a town just captured (they traveled with the front line units-hence their nickname of spearhead detachments), would be to arrange for the dead to be buried, restore rationing, put police back on the streets, and if possible get electricity and water working. Soon after, they would begin identifying Nazis from non-Nazis (as best they could), and when possible reestablish a local government. 36 In the larger cities the same formula was used, although the spearhead detachments were much larger, and the difficulties they faced much more pronounced. In both cases, these military government officers observed that the people's first reaction "seemed to be to regard any unguarded property as free for the taking" 37 Aside from this looting, other common problems were the inability to get the railroads, the power grid, and the food distribution systems functioning again. 38 Later, as the war came to an end, the largest issues dealt with the handling of displaced persons, refugees, and prisoners of war, as well as the reestablishment of functional governments and institutions at every level within Germany.
As the American Army moved across Germany, the civil-affairs detachments moving with the tactical units would be assigned to run towns based on the ECAD plan established in 1944.
Unfortunately, the number of detachments was insufficient. By the spring of 1945, detachments were forced to handle multiple towns and areas. Soon afterwards, there were no unassigned detachments remaining, and the armies began to draw provisional detachments out of their tactical units. An example is the Ninth Army, which, modeled its internal detachments after those of the ECAD, established a Ninth Army Military Government Unit of 900 officers and soldiers. They rushed these detachments through a two-week course and assigned them to municipalities as they continued their march towards Berlin. widespread hunger, with rationing of food set at 1500 calories a day-1200 of that in bread and potatoes-and very little heating coal and electricity available. 42 Three months after the war ended, industry in the American zone was only running at 5 percent of capacity, and housing was a serious problem, as three quarters of the dwellings were in serious need of repair. 43 Not only were there serious problems with post-war government and reconstruction, the American soldiers became restless and ill-disciplined. In late November of 1945, the Seventh Army report found that "the general opinion of the Germans is that American soldiers are men who drink to excess, have no respect for the uniform they wear, are prone to rowdyism and to beat civilians with no regard for human rights, and benefit themselves through the black market." 44 Numerous incidents of rape and murder were substantiated, to the point that General Eisenhower warned the soldiers that these acts could give the U.S. forces "a bad reputation that will take our country a long time to overcome." 45 As for the denazification process, the resources were not there to really complete this task with much effectiveness. Of the 3.6 million Germans considered chargeable, only 887,252 were ever tried, and of these only 8,385 saw confinement. 46 The rest melted back into the population and German society. better serve Combatant Commanders' ability to conduct full spectrum operations: "Services will continue to modernize force organizations to achieve improved modularity so Combatant
Commanders can more readily organize forces to tasks." 48 The intent is to create a modular 'brigade based' Army that is more responsive to regional combatant commanders needs, better employs Joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as self contained units capable of full spectrum operations. can be applied to conventional tactical units. Their conclusion that special operations units are not well trained on IO operations at the tactical level reinforces the fact that conventional forces are even less prepared for these operations.
All these capabilities-FAO's, linguists, civil affairs, public affairs, psychological affairs, IO experts, and other Special Forces operatives-are needed for full-spectrum operations. But as history has shown, they are needed not just at the strategic and operational planning levels, nor just as shadowy special teams operating apart from the major tactical units on the ground, but rather as a critical component of operations at the tactical level and in tandem with conventional forces. That is where the critical actions and interactions occur; that is where the battle for security and reconstruction, and for the hearts and minds of the population, is won or lost. As the United States further develops its Unit of Actions' organization, manning, and training structure, an omission of these critical elements would be a terrible shortcoming, and could lead to a repeat of the mistakes made throughout the past century.
These changes should not wait. General Schoomaker believes these capabilities are urgently needed, as "the nation has developed a national strategy, a military strategy that says we're going to be more proactive than we have in the past. And that means we're going to have to be able to be strategically agile [and] able to do things faster and farther and deeper than we have before." 62 He recently described a new focus on army units smaller than the divisions that are the dominant organization today: "My view is we need to be thinking about brigade kinds of things, how many brigades do you have to rotate to meet requirements…What we're looking at internally as we reorganize the army is how to increase the brigade-level organizations, how will we move enablers into brigade-level organizations to get a brigade that is more capable, and
[provide it] with the joint connectivity that is required for it to be able to leverage all of the joint resources at that level" 63 According to the Army Chief of Staff, each new brigade must be able to:
• Have enough command-and-control capability to operate independently.
• Establish and maintain information superiority.
• Conduct prompt and sustained land warfare.
• Engage and attack precisely.
• Control people and territory.
• Deploy flexibly.
The redesigned brigades must also be more joint -that is, networked with units from other services on the battlefield. seven years in Germany and Japan (and one could argue they continued many decades after that), certainly continued for decades in Korea, and are still ongoing in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. In those areas where they did not continue for a substantial time, we failed (Somalia and Haiti). Although the military is charged with providing a safe and secure environment in their area of operations, it is civilian agencies that are normally responsible for reconstruction. But this will not happen until the warfighters have obtained a relatively secure environment. During the period of combat operations, and often for some time after while a secure environment is being developed, civilian agencies will not have access to the areas where they are needed most.
This is also the period of time when the most critical humanitarian assistance, public security and governance is often required. Therefore the military must be prepared to conduct these operations-even if they must do so while concurrent military operations are ongoing-until the mantle can be passed to the later arriving civilian agencies. Initial law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction efforts, restoration of civil administration and emergency and public services such as medical, power, water and other economic recovery and quality of life services will fall to the military to accomplish. This will occur at a time when the status of the war effort is in the most flux, and Rules of Engagement may be changing. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Assign civil affairs and public affairs teams to the Units of Action; ensure the WORD COUNT= 8,998
